{"id":49,"date":"2014-12-28T00:39:25","date_gmt":"2014-12-27T23:39:25","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.archipress.org\/wp\/?page_id=49"},"modified":"2015-01-18T21:13:31","modified_gmt":"2015-01-18T20:13:31","slug":"leibniz-un-rationaliste-mystique","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.archipress.org\/?page_id=49","title":{"rendered":"Leibniz. Un rationaliste mystique"},"content":{"rendered":"
Monadologie. Epist\u00eam\u00e8 du pli<\/strong><\/div>\n

\"Leibniz, La Monadologie, Principes de philosophie<\/em>, 1714.<\/p>\n

PRINCIPIA PHILOSOPHI\u00c6 SEU THESES IN GRATIAM PRINCIPIS EUGENII CONSCRIPT\u00c6<\/em><\/p>\n

Voici en un court et \u00e9blouissant trait\u00e9 le r\u00e9sum\u00e9 de la pens\u00e9e de Leibniz. La Monadologie <\/em>est la quintessence philosophique de sesEssais de Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e<\/em>. Or il se trouve que ces principes philosophiques permettent de d\u00e9passer l’incompl\u00e9tude et les trous de la th\u00e9orie actuelle de la complexit\u00e9 (notamment pour ce qui concerne l’\u00e9mergence et l’auto-organisation). Douze ann\u00e9es de recherche sur la complexit\u00e9 aupr\u00e8s d’auteurs et de chercheurs de tous horizons n’ont pas permis de rep\u00e9rer le lien manquant qui contournerait cette manifestation g\u00eanante que constitue la verticalit\u00e9 des propri\u00e9t\u00e9s et du sens entre la partie-fragment et le tout-ensemble. Cette verticalit\u00e9 fait que nous n’avons jamais v\u00e9ritablement quitt\u00e9 l’analyse classique tout-partie. Ce lien explicatif manquant d’une complexit\u00e9 fut trouv\u00e9 dans l’ouvrage de Gilles Deleuze, Le pli. Leibniz et le baroque <\/em>(Minuit, 1988), et bien qu’il n’ait pas trait\u00e9 directement de complexit\u00e9 (complecti<\/em>) mais de multi-pli-cit\u00e9<\/em>. L’\u00e9tape deleuzienne aura \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9cisive.<\/p>\n

Cette complexit\u00e9 qui s’exprime dans les relations tout-partie trouve avec Leibniz et son souci du d\u00e9tail<\/em>, de lamani\u00e8re <\/em>et du pli <\/em>une \u00e9pist\u00e9mologie v\u00e9ritablement alternative par rapport \u00e0 la vision r\u00e9ductionniste et l’analyse classique du tout en parties. Gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 la monadologie, on comprend mieux comment plus on creuse, plus on s’enfonce en r\u00e9alit\u00e9, plus la mati\u00e8re est marqu\u00e9e par la multiplicit\u00e9. La mati\u00e8re ne se d\u00e9coupe pas aussi bien qu’elle se plie, replie, remplit, d\u00e9ploie ses plis qui \u00ab\u00a0vont \u00e0 l’infini\u00a0\u00bb.<\/p>\n

Voici donc en l’an 2010 un \u00e9clairage philosophique qui permet de renouveler notre compr\u00e9hension des rapports entre le fragment (in)signifiant et l\u2019ensemble incommensurable, que ce soit dans les sciences du vivant, de la mati\u00e8re et du calcul. Leibniz, philosophe et math\u00e9maticien (co-inventeur avec Newton du calcul diff\u00e9rentiel), est l’homme de la compl\u00e9tude (insan kamil<\/em>). Il formule ici 90 propositions vitalistes sur le simple<\/em>; autant de points de vue, perspectives sur le complexe<\/em>.<\/p>\n

R\u00e9da Benkirane<\/div>\n
<\/div>\n
\n

La Monadologie <\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz<\/strong><\/p>\n

[English text<\/a>]<\/p>\n

[c’est nous qui soulignons]<\/p>\n

1. La Monade<\/em><\/strong>, dont nous parlerons ici, n\u2019est autre chose qu\u2019une substance simple, qui entre dans les compos\u00e9s ; simple<\/em>, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire sans parties<\/strong> (Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e<\/em>.,\u00a7 10 3).<\/div>\n

2. Et il faut qu\u2019il y ait des substances simples, puisqu\u2019il y a des compos\u00e9s ; car le compos\u00e9 n\u2019est autre chose qu\u2019un amas ou aggregatum<\/em> des simples.<\/strong><\/p>\n

3. Or l\u00e0, o\u00f9 il n\u2019y a point de parties, il n\u2019y a ni \u00e9tendue, ni figure, ni divisibilit\u00e9 possible. Et ces Monades sont les v\u00e9ritables Atomes de la Nature et en un mot les \u00c9l\u00e9ments des choses.<\/strong><\/p>\n

4. Il n\u2019y a aussi point de dissolution \u00e0 craindre, et il n\u2019y a aucune mani\u00e8re concevable par laquelle une substance simple puisse p\u00e9rir naturellement (Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e, <\/em>\u00a7 89).<\/p>\n

5. Par la m\u00eame raison il n\u2019y a en aucune par laquelle une substance simple puisse commencer naturellement, puisqu\u2019elle ne saurait \u00eatre form\u00e9e par composition.<\/p>\n

6. Ainsi on peut dire, que les Monades ne sauraient commencer, ni finir, que tout d\u2019un coup, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire,elles ne sauraient commencer que par cr\u00e9ation et finir que par annihilation ; au lieu, que ce qui est compos\u00e9, commence ou finit par parties.<\/strong><\/p>\n

7. Il n\u2019y a pas moyen aussi d\u2019expliquer, comment une Monade puisse \u00eatre alt\u00e9r\u00e9e ou chang\u00e9e dans son int\u00e9rieur par quelque autre cr\u00e9ature ; puisqu\u2019on n\u2019y saurait rien transposer, ni concevoir en elle aucun mouvement interne, qui puisse \u00eatre excit\u00e9, dirig\u00e9, augment\u00e9 ou diminu\u00e9 l\u00e0 dedans ; comme cela se peut dans les compos\u00e9s, o\u00f9 il y a des changements entre les parties. Les Monades n\u2019ont point de fen\u00eatres, par lesquelles quelque chose y puisse entrer ou sortir.<\/strong> Les accidents ne sauraient se d\u00e9tacher, ni se promener hors des substances, comme faisaient autrefois les esp\u00e8ces sensibles des Scolastiques. Ainsi ni substance, ni accident peut entrer de dehors dans une Monade.<\/strong><\/p>\n

8. Cependant il faut que les Monades aient quelques qualit\u00e9s, autrement ce ne seraient pas m\u00eame des \u00eatres. Et si les substances simples ne diff\u00e9raient point par leurs qualit\u00e9s ; il n\u2019y aurait pas moyen de s\u2019apercevoir d\u2019aucun changement dans les choses ; puisque ce qui est dans le compos\u00e9 ne peut venir que des ingr\u00e9dients simples ; et les Monades \u00e9tant sans qualit\u00e9s, seraient indistinguables l\u2019une de l\u2019autre, puisque aussi bien elles ne diff\u00e8rent point en quantit\u00e9 : et par cons\u00e9quent le plein \u00e9tant suppos\u00e9, chaque lieu ne recevrait toujours, dans le mouvement, que l\u2019\u00c9quivalent de ce qu\u2019il avait eu, et un \u00e9tat des choses serait indiscernable de l\u2019autre.<\/p>\n

9. Il faut m\u00eame, que chaque Monade soit diff\u00e9rente de chaque autre. Car il n\u2019y a jamais dans la nature deux \u00catres, qui soient parfaitement l\u2019un comme l\u2019autre<\/strong> et o\u00f9 il ne soit possible de trouver une diff\u00e9rence interne, ou fond\u00e9e sur une d\u00e9nomination intrins\u00e8que.<\/p>\n

10. Je prends aussi pour accord\u00e9 que tout \u00eatre cr\u00e9\u00e9 est sujet au changement, et par cons\u00e9quent la Monade cr\u00e9\u00e9e aussi, et m\u00eame que ce changement est continuel dans chacune.<\/p>\n

11. Il s\u2019ensuit de ce que nous venons de dire, que les changements naturels des Monades viennent d\u2019unprincipe interne<\/em>, puisqu\u2019une cause externe ne saurait influer dans son int\u00e9rieur.<\/strong><\/p>\n

12. Mais il faut aussi qu\u2019outre le principe du changement il y ait un d\u00e9tail de ce qui change<\/em>, qui fasse pour ainsi dire la sp\u00e9cification et la vari\u00e9t\u00e9 des substances simples.<\/strong><\/p>\n

13. Ce d\u00e9tail doit envelopper une multitude dans l\u2019unit\u00e9 ou dans le simple.<\/strong> Car tout changement naturel se faisant par degr\u00e9s, quelque chose changeet quelque chose reste ; et par cons\u00e9quent il faut que dans la substance simple il y ait une pluralit\u00e9 d\u2019affections et de rapports, quoiqu\u2019il n\u2019y en ait point de parties.<\/p>\n

14. L\u2019\u00e9tat passager, qui enveloppe et repr\u00e9sente une multitude dans l\u2019unit\u00e9 ou dans la substance simple, n\u2019est autre chose que ce qu\u2019on appelle la Perception<\/em><\/strong>, qu\u2019on doit distinguer de l\u2019aperception ou de la conscience, comme il para\u00eetra dans la suite. Et c\u2019est en quoi les Cart\u00e9siens ont fort manqu\u00e9, ayant compt\u00e9 pour rien les perceptions, dont on ne s\u2019aper\u00e7oit pas.<\/strong> C\u2019est aussi ce qui les a fait croire que les seuls Esprits \u00e9taient des Monades et qu\u2019il n\u2019y avait point d\u2019Ames des B\u00eates ni d\u2019autres Ent\u00e9l\u00e9chies ; et qu\u2019ils ont confondu avec le vulgaire un long \u00e9tourdissement avec une mort \u00e0 la rigueur, ce qui les a fait encore donner dans le pr\u00e9jug\u00e9 scolastique des \u00e2mes enti\u00e8rement s\u00e9par\u00e9es, et a m\u00eame confirm\u00e9 les esprits mal tourn\u00e9s dans l\u2019opinion de la mortalit\u00e9 des \u00e2mes.<\/p>\n

15. L\u2019action du principe interne qui fait le changement ou le passage d\u2019une perception \u00e0 une autre, peut \u00eatre appel\u00e9 App\u00e9tition : il est vrai que l\u2019app\u00e9tit ne saurait toujours parvenir enti\u00e8rement \u00e0 toute la perception, o\u00f9 il tend, mais il en obtient toujours quelque chose, et parvient \u00e0 des perceptions
\nnouvelles.<\/p>\n

16. Nous exp\u00e9rimentons nous-m\u00eames une multitude dans la substance simple, lorsque nous trouvons que la moindre pens\u00e9e dont nous nous apercevons, enveloppe une vari\u00e9t\u00e9 dans l\u2019objet. Ainsi tous ceux qui reconnaissent que l\u2019\u00e2me est une substance simple, doivent reconna\u00eetre cette multitude dans la Monade ; et Monsieur Bayle ne devait point y trouver de la difficult\u00e9, comme il a fait dans son Dictionnaire article Rorarius.<\/p>\n

17. On est oblig\u00e9 d\u2019ailleurs de confesser que la Perception<\/em> et ce qui en d\u00e9pend, est inexplicable par des raisons m\u00e9caniques<\/em>, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire par les figures et par les mouvements. <\/strong>Et feignant qu\u2019il y ait une Machine, dont la structure fasse penser, sentir, avoir perception ; on pourra la concevoir agrandie en conservant les m\u00eames proportions, en sorte qu\u2019on y puisse entrer, comme dans un moulin. Et cela pos\u00e9, on ne trouvera en la visitant au dedans, que des pi\u00e8ces, qui poussent les unes les autres, et jamais de quoi expliquer une perception.<\/strong> Ainsi c\u2019est dans la substance simple, et non dans le compos\u00e9, ou dans la machine qu\u2019il la faut chercher. Aussi n\u2019y a-t-il que cela qu\u2019on puisse trouver dans la substance simple, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire, les perceptions et leurs changements. C\u2019est en cela seul aussi que peuvent consister toutes les Actions internes des substances simples.<\/p>\n

18. On pourrait donner le nom d\u2019Ent\u00e9l\u00e9chies \u00e0 toutes les substances simples, ou Monades cr\u00e9\u00e9es, car elles ont en elles une certaine perfection (\u00e9chousi to entel\u00e9s), il y a une suffisance (autarkeia) qui les rend sources de leurs actions internes et pour ainsi dire des Automates incorporels (Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e, <\/em>\u00a7 87).<\/p>\n

19. Si nous voulons appeler Ame tout ce qui a perceptions<\/em> et app\u00e9tits<\/em> dans le sens g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, que je viens d\u2019expliquer ; toutes les substances simples ou Monades cr\u00e9\u00e9es pourraient \u00eatre appel\u00e9es Ames ; <\/strong>mais, comme le sentiment est quelque chose de plus qu\u2019une simple perception, je consens que le nom g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de Monades et d\u2019Ent\u00e9l\u00e9chies suffise aux substances simples qui n\u2019auront que cela ; et qu\u2019on appelleAmes<\/em> seulement celles dont la perception est plus distincte et accompagn\u00e9e de m\u00e9moire<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

20. Car nous exp\u00e9rimentons en nous-m\u00eames un \u00e9tat, o\u00f9 nous ne nous souvenons de rien et n\u2019avons aucune perception distingu\u00e9e ; comme lorsque nous tombons en d\u00e9faillance, ou quand nous sommes accabl\u00e9s d\u2019un profond sommeil sans aucun songe. Dans cet \u00e9tat l\u2019\u00e2me ne diff\u00e8re point sensiblement d\u2019une simple Monade ; mais comme cet \u00e9tat n\u2019est point durable, et qu\u2019elle s\u2019en tire, elle est quelque chose de plus (Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e, <\/em>\u00a7 64).<\/p>\n

21. Et il ne s\u2019ensuit point qu\u2019alors la substance simple soit sans aucune perception. Cela ne se peut pas m\u00eame par les raisons susdites ; car elle ne saurait p\u00e9rir, elle ne saurait aussi subsister sans quelque affection qui n\u2019est autre chose que sa perception : mais quand il y a une grande multitude de petites perceptions, o\u00f9 il n\u2019y a rien de distingu\u00e9, on est \u00e9tourdi ; comme quand on tourne continuellement d\u2019un m\u00eame sens plusieurs fois de suite, o\u00f9 il vient un vertige qui peut nous faire \u00e9vanouir et qui ne nous laisse rien distinguer. Et la mort peut donner cet \u00e9tat pour un temps aux animaux.<\/p>\n

22. Et comme tout pr\u00e9sent \u00e9tat d\u2019une substance simple est naturellement une suite de son \u00e9tat pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent,tellement que le pr\u00e9sent y est gros de l\u2019avenir.<\/strong><\/p>\n

23. Donc, puisque r\u00e9veill\u00e9 de l\u2019\u00e9tourdissement on s\u2019aper\u00e7oit <\/em>de ses perceptions, il faut bien qu\u2019on en ait eu imm\u00e9diatement auparavant, quoiqu\u2019on ne s\u2019en soit point aper\u00e7u ; car une perception ne saurait venir naturellement qued\u2019une autre perception, comme un mouvement ne peut venir naturellement que d\u2019un mouvement (\u00a7 401-403).<\/p>\n

24. L\u2019on voit par l\u00e0 que si nous n\u2019avions rien de distingu\u00e9 et pour ainsi dire de relev\u00e9, et d\u2019un plus haut go\u00fbt dans nos perceptions, nous serions toujours dans l\u2019\u00e9tourdissement. Et c\u2019est l\u2019\u00e9tat des Monades toutes nues.<\/strong><\/p>\n

25. Aussi voyons-nous que la Nature a donn\u00e9 des perceptions relev\u00e9es aux animaux, par les soins qu\u2019elle a pris de leur fournir des organes, qui ramassent plusieurs rayons de lumi\u00e8re ou plusieurs ondulations de l\u2019air, pour les faire avoir plus d\u2019efficace par leur union. Il y a quelque chose d\u2019approchant dans l\u2019odeur, dans le go\u00fbt et dans l\u2019attouchement, et peut-\u00eatre dans quantit\u00e9 d\u2019autres sens, qui nous sont inconnus. Et j\u2019expliquerai tant\u00f4t, comment ce qui se passe dans l\u2019\u00e2me repr\u00e9sente ce qui se fait dans les organes.<\/p>\n

26. La m\u00e9moire fournit une esp\u00e8ce de cons\u00e9cution aux \u00e2mes, qui imite la raison, mais qui en doit \u00eatre distingu\u00e9e.<\/strong> C\u2019est que nous voyons que les animaux, ayant la perception de quelque chose qui les frappe et dont ils ont eu perception semblable auparavant, s\u2019attendent par la repr\u00e9sentation de leur m\u00e9moire \u00e0 ce qui y a \u00e9t\u00e9 joint dans cette perception pr\u00e9c\u00e9dente et sont port\u00e9s \u00e0 des sentiments semblables \u00e0 ceux qu\u2019ils avaient pris alors. Par exemple : quand on montre le b\u00e2ton aux chiens, ils se souviennent de la douleur qu\u2019il leur a caus\u00e9e et crient et fuient (Pr\u00e9lim. 5, \u00a7 65)<\/p>\n

27. Et l\u2019imagination forte qui les frappe et \u00e9meut, vient ou de la grandeur ou de la multitude des perceptions pr\u00e9c\u00e9dentes. Car souvent une impression forte fait tout d\u2019un coup l\u2019effet d\u2019une longue habitude ou de beaucoup de perceptions m\u00e9diocres r\u00e9it\u00e9r\u00e9es.<\/p>\n

28. Les hommes agissent comme les b\u00eates, en tant que les cons\u00e9cutions de leurs perceptions ne se font que par le principe de la m\u00e9moire ; ressemblant aux m\u00e9decins empiriques, qui ont une simple pratique sans th\u00e9orie ; et nous ne sommes qu\u2019empiriques dans les trois quarts de nos actions. Par exemple,
\nquand on s\u2019attend qu\u2019il y aura jour demain, on agit en empirique, parce quecela s\u2019est toujours fait ainsi, jusqu\u2019ici. Il n\u2019y a que l\u2019astronome qui le juge par raison.<\/p>\n

29. Mais la connaissance des v\u00e9rit\u00e9s n\u00e9cessaires et \u00e9ternelles est ce qui nous distingue des simples animaux et nous fait avoir la Raison et les sciences ; en nous \u00e9levant \u00e0 la connaissance de nous-m\u00eames et de Dieu. Et c\u2019est ce qu\u2019on appelle en nous \u00c2me raisonnable, ou Esprit<\/em>.<\/strong><\/p>\n

30. C\u2019est aussi par la connaissance des v\u00e9rit\u00e9s n\u00e9cessaires et par leurs abstractions que nous sommes \u00e9lev\u00e9s aux actes r\u00e9flexifs, qui nous font penser \u00e0 ce qui s\u2019appelle moi et \u00e0 consid\u00e9rer que ceci ou cela est en nous : et c\u2019est ainsi qu\u2019en pensant \u00e0 nous, nous pensons \u00e0 l\u2019\u00catre, \u00e0 la Substance, au simple et au compos\u00e9, \u00e0 l\u2019immat\u00e9riel et \u00e0 Dieu m\u00eame ; en concevant que ce qui est born\u00e9 en nous, est en lui sans bornes. Et ces actes r\u00e9flexifs fournissent les objets principaux de nos raisonnements (Th\u00e9od., Pr\u00e9f. *, 4, a 6)<\/p>\n

31. Nos raisonnements sont fond\u00e9s sur deux grands principes, celui de la contradiction en vertu duquel nous jugeons faux ce qui en enveloppe, et vrai ce qui est oppos\u00e9 ou contradictoire au faux (\u00a7 44, \u00a7 196).<\/p>\n

32. Et celui de la raison suffisante, en vertu duquel nous consid\u00e9rons qu\u2019aucun fait ne saurait se trouver vrai, ou existant, aucune \u00e9nonciation v\u00e9ritable, sans qu\u2019il y ait une raison suffisante pourquoi il en soit ainsi et non pas autrement. Quoique ces raisons le plus souvent ne puissent point nous \u00eatre connues (\u00a7 44, \u00a7 196).<\/p>\n

33. Il y a aussi deux sortes de v\u00e9rit\u00e9s, celles de Raisonnement<\/em> et celle de Fait<\/em>. Les v\u00e9rit\u00e9s de Raisonnement sont n\u00e9cessaires et leur oppos\u00e9 est impossible, et celles de Fait sont contingentes et leur oppos\u00e9 est possible. Quand une v\u00e9rit\u00e9 est n\u00e9cessaire, on en peut trouver la raison par l\u2019analyse, la r\u00e9solvant en id\u00e9es et en v\u00e9rit\u00e9s plus simples, jusqu\u2019\u00e0 ce qu\u2019on vienne aux primitive.<\/strong><\/p>\n

34. C\u2019est ainsi que chez les Math\u00e9maticiens, les th\u00e9or\u00e8mes de sp\u00e9culation et les canons de pratique sont r\u00e9duits par l\u2019analyse aux D\u00e9finitions<\/em>, Axiomes<\/em> et Demandes<\/em>.<\/p>\n

35. Et il y a enfin des id\u00e9es simples dont on ne saurait donner la d\u00e9finition ; il y a aussi des Axiomes et Demandes, ou en un mot, des principes primitifs, qui ne sauraient \u00eatre prouv\u00e9s et n\u2019en ont point besoin aussi ; et ce sont les \u00c9nonciations identiques, dont l\u2019oppos\u00e9 contient une contradiction expresse (\u00a7 36, 37, 44, 45, 49, 52, 121-122, 337, 340-344).<\/p>\n

36. Mais la raison suffisante se doit trouver aussi dans les v\u00e9rit\u00e9s contingentes ou de fait, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire, dans la suite des choses r\u00e9pandues par l\u2019univers des cr\u00e9atures ; o\u00f9 la r\u00e9solution en raisons particuli\u00e8res pourrait aller \u00e0 un d\u00e9tail sans bornes, \u00e0 cause de la vari\u00e9t\u00e9 immense des choses de la Nature et de la division des corps \u00e0 l\u2019infini. Il y a une infinit\u00e9 de figures et de mouvements pr\u00e9sents et pass\u00e9s qui entrent dans la cause efficiente de mon \u00e9criture pr\u00e9sente ; et il y a une infinit\u00e9 de petites inclinations et dispositions de mon \u00e2me, pr\u00e9sentes et pass\u00e9es, qui entrent dans la cause finale.<\/p>\n

37. Et comme tout ce d\u00e9tail <\/em>n\u2019enveloppe que d\u2019autres contingents ant\u00e9rieurs ou plus d\u00e9taill\u00e9s, dont chacun a encore besoin d\u2019une analyse semblable pour en rendre raison, on n\u2019en est pas plus avanc\u00e9 : et il faut que la raison suffisante ou derni\u00e8re soit hors de la suite ou s\u00e9ries <\/em>de ce d\u00e9tail des contingences, quelqu\u2019infini qu\u2019il pourrait \u00eatre.<\/p>\n

38. Et c\u2019est ainsi que la derni\u00e8re raison des choses doit \u00eatre dans une substance n\u00e9cessaire, dans laquelle le d\u00e9tail des changements ne soit qu\u2019\u00e9minemment, comme dans la source : et c\u2019est ce que nous appelons Dieu (\u00a7 7).<\/p>\n

39. Or cette substance \u00e9tant une raison suffisante de tout ce d\u00e9tail, lequel aussi est li\u00e9 par tout ; il n\u2019y a qu\u2019un Dieu, et ce Dieu suffit.<\/p>\n

40. On peut juger aussi que cette substance supr\u00eame qui est unique, universelle et n\u00e9cessaire, n\u2019ayant rien hors d\u2019elle qui en soit ind\u00e9pendant, et \u00e9tant une suite simple de l\u2019\u00eatre possible ; doit \u00eatre incapable de limites et contenir tout autant de r\u00e9alit\u00e9 qu\u2019il est possible.<\/p>\n

41. D\u2019o\u00f9 il s\u2019ensuit que Dieu est absolument parfait ; la perfection n\u2019\u00e9tant autre chose que la grandeur de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 positive prise pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment, en mettant \u00e0 part les limites ou bornes dans les choses qui en ont. Et l\u00e0, o\u00f9 il n\u2019y a point de bornes, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire, en Dieu, la perfection est absolument infinie (\u00a7 22,
\nPr\u00e9f.*, 4 a 7).<\/p>\n

42. Il s\u2019ensuit aussi que les cr\u00e9atures ont leurs perfections de l\u2019influence de Dieu, mais qu\u2019elles ont leurs imperfections de leur nature propre, incapable d\u2019\u00eatre sans bornes. Car c\u2019est en cela qu\u2019elles sont distingu\u00e9es de Dieu. Cette imperfection originale des cr\u00e9atures se remarque dans l\u2019inertie naturelle des
\ncorps (\u00a7 20, 27-30, 153, 167, 377 et suiv.).<\/p>\n

43. Il est vrai aussi qu\u2019en Dieu est non seulement la source des existences, mais encore celles des essences, en tant que r\u00e9elles, ou de ce qu\u2019il y a de r\u00e9el dans la possibilit\u00e9. C\u2019est parce que l\u2019entendement de Dieu est la r\u00e9gion des v\u00e9rit\u00e9s \u00e9ternelles, ou des id\u00e9es dont elles d\u00e9pendent, et que sans lui il n\u2019y
\naurait rien de r\u00e9el dans les possibilit\u00e9s, et non seulement rien d\u2019existant, mais encore rien de possible (\u00a7 20).<\/p>\n

44. Car il faut bien que s\u2019il y a une r\u00e9alit\u00e9 dans les essences ou possibilit\u00e9s, ou bien dans les v\u00e9rit\u00e9s \u00e9ternelles, cette r\u00e9alit\u00e9 soit fond\u00e9e en quelque chose d\u2019existant et d\u2019actuel ; et par cons\u00e9quent dans l\u2019existence de l\u2019\u00catre n\u00e9cessaire, dans lequel l\u2019essence renferme l\u2019existence, ou dans lequel il suffit d\u2019\u00eatre possible pour \u00eatre actuel (\u00a7 184-189, 335).<\/p>\n

45. Ainsi Dieu seul (ou l\u2019\u00catre n\u00e9cessaire) a ce privil\u00e8ge qu\u2019il faut qu\u2019il existe s\u2019il est possible. Et comme rien ne peut emp\u00eacher la possibilit\u00e9 de ce qui n\u2019enferme aucunes bornes, aucune n\u00e9gation, et par cons\u00e9quent, aucune contradiction, cela seul suffit pour conna\u00eetre l\u2019existence de Dieu a priori. Nous l\u2019avons prouv\u00e9e aussi par la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 des v\u00e9rit\u00e9s \u00e9ternelles. Mais nous venons de la prouver aussi a posteriori puisque des \u00eatres contingents existent, lesquels ne sauraient avoir leur raison derni\u00e8re ou suffisante que dans l\u2019\u00eatre n\u00e9cessaire, qui a la raison de son existence en lui-m\u00eame.<\/p>\n

46. Cependant il ne faut point s\u2019imaginer avec quelques-uns, que les v\u00e9rit\u00e9s \u00e9ternelles, \u00e9tant d\u00e9pendantes de Dieu, sont arbitraires et d\u00e9pendent de sa volont\u00e9, comme Descartes para\u00eet l\u2019avoir pris et puis M. Poiret. Cela n\u2019est v\u00e9ritable que des v\u00e9rit\u00e9s contingentes, dont le principe est la convenance <\/em>ou le choix dumeilleur<\/em> <\/strong>; au lieu que les v\u00e9rit\u00e9s n\u00e9cessaires d\u00e9pendent uniquement de son entendement, et en sont l\u2019objet interne (\u00a7 180-184, 185, 335, 351, 380).<\/p>\n

47. Ainsi Dieu seul est l\u2019unit\u00e9 primitive, ou la substance simple originaire, dont toutes les Monades cr\u00e9\u00e9es ou d\u00e9rivatives sont des productions et naissent, pour ainsi dire, par des Fulgurations continuelles de la Divinit\u00e9 de moment en moment, born\u00e9es par la r\u00e9ceptivit\u00e9 de la cr\u00e9ature, \u00e0 laquelle il est essentiel d\u2019\u00eatre limit\u00e9e<\/strong> (\u00a7 382-391, 398, 395).<\/p>\n

48. Il y a en Dieu la Puissance<\/em>, qui est la source de tout, puis la Connaissance <\/em>qui contient le d\u00e9tail des id\u00e9es, et enfin la Volont\u00e9<\/em>, qui fait les changements ou productions selon le principe du meilleur<\/strong>(\u00a7 7, 149-150). Et c\u2019est ce qui r\u00e9pond \u00e0 ce qui, dans les monades cr\u00e9\u00e9es, fait le sujet ou la base, la facult\u00e9 perceptive et la facult\u00e9 app\u00e9titive. Mais en Dieu ces attributs sont absolument infinis ou parfaits ; et dans les Monades cr\u00e9\u00e9es ou dans les Ent\u00e9l\u00e9chies (ou perfectihabies, comme Hermola\u00fcs Barbarus traduisait ce mot) ce n\u2019en sont que des imitations, \u00e0 mesure qu\u2019il y a de la perfection (\u00a7 87).<\/p>\n

49. La cr\u00e9ature est dite agir<\/em> au-dehors en tant qu\u2019elle a de la perfection, et p\u00e2tir<\/em> d\u2019une autre, en tant qu\u2019elle est imparfaite. Ainsi l\u2019on attribue l\u2019action<\/em>passion<\/em> en tant qu\u2019elle en a de confuses <\/strong>\u00e0 la Monade, en tant qu\u2019elle a des perceptions distinctes, et la (\u00a7 32, 66, 386).<\/p>\n

50. Et une cr\u00e9ature est plus parfaite qu\u2019une autre, en ce qu\u2019on trouve en elle ce qui sert \u00e0 rendre raison a priori de ce qui se passe dans l\u2019autre, et c\u2019est par l\u00e0 qu\u2019on dit qu\u2019elle agit sur l\u2019autre.<\/p>\n

51. Mais dans les substances simples ce n\u2019est qu\u2019une influence id\u00e9ale <\/em>d\u2019une monade sur l\u2019autre, qui ne peut avoir son effet que par l\u2019intervention de Dieu, en tant que dans les id\u00e9es de Dieu une monade demande avec raison, que Dieu en r\u00e9glant les autres d\u00e8s le commencement des choses, ait \u00e9gard \u00e0 elle.<\/strong> Car puisqu\u2019une Monade cr\u00e9\u00e9e ne saurait avoir une influence physique sur l\u2019int\u00e9rieur de l\u2019autre, ce n\u2019est que par ce moyen que l\u2019une peut avoir de la d\u00e9pendance de l\u2019autre (\u00a7 9, 54, 65-66, 201. Abr\u00e9g\u00e9 object. 3).<\/p>\n

52. Et c\u2019est par l\u00e0, qu\u2019entre les cr\u00e9atures les actions et passions sont mutuelles. Car Dieu comparant deux substances simples, trouve en chacune des raisons, qui l\u2019obligent \u00e0 y accommoder l\u2019autre ; et par cons\u00e9quent ce qui est actif \u00e0 certains \u00e9gards, est passif suivant un autre point de consid\u00e9ration :
\nactif en tant, que ce qu\u2019on conna\u00eet distinctement en lui, sert \u00e0 rendre raison de ce qui se passe dans un autre ; et passif en tant que la raison de ce qui se passe en lui, se trouve dans ce qui se conna\u00eet distinctement dans un autre (\u00a7 66).<\/p>\n

53. Or, comme il y a une infinit\u00e9 d\u2019univers possibles dans les Id\u00e9es de Dieu et qu\u2019il n\u2019en peut exister qu\u2019un seul, il faut qu\u2019il y ait une raison suffisante du choix de Dieu, qui le d\u00e9termine \u00e0 l\u2019un plut\u00f4t qu\u2019\u00e0 l\u2019autre<\/strong> (\u00a7 8,10, 44, 173, 196 et s., 225, 414-416).<\/p>\n

54. Et cette raison ne peut se trouver que dans la convenance, ou dans les degr\u00e9s de perfection, que ces mondes contiennent ; chaque possible ayant droit de pr\u00e9tendre \u00e0 l\u2019existence \u00e0 mesure de la perfection qu\u2019il enveloppe<\/strong> (\u00a7 74, 167, 350, 201, 130, 352, 345 et s., 354).<\/p>\n

55. Et c\u2019est ce qui est la cause de l\u2019existence du meilleur, que la sagesse fait conna\u00eetre \u00e0 Dieu, que sa bont\u00e9 le fait choisir, et que sa puissance le fait produire<\/strong> (\u00a7 8, 7, 80, 84, 119, 204, 206, 208. Abr\u00e9g\u00e9 object. 1, object. 8).<\/p>\n

56. Or cette liaison ou cet accommodement de toutes les choses cr\u00e9\u00e9es \u00e0 chacune et de chacune \u00e0 toutes les autres, fait que chaque substance simple a des rapports qui expriment toutes les autres, et qu\u2019elle est par cons\u00e9quent un miroir vivant perp\u00e9tuel de l\u2019univers<\/strong> (\u00a7 130, 360).<\/p>\n

57. Et, comme une m\u00eame ville regard\u00e9e de diff\u00e9rents c\u00f4t\u00e9s para\u00eet tout autre, et est comme multipli\u00e9e perspectivement ; il arrive de m\u00eame, que par la multitude infinie des substances simples, il y a comme autant de diff\u00e9rents univers, qui ne sont pourtant que les perspectives d\u2019un seul selon les diff\u00e9rents points de vue<\/em> de chaque Monade.<\/strong><\/p>\n

58. Et c\u2019est le moyen d\u2019obtenir autant de vari\u00e9t\u00e9 qu\u2019il est possible, mais avec le plus grand ordre, qui se puisse, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire, c\u2019est le moyen d\u2019obtenir autant de perfection qu\u2019il se peut <\/strong>(\u00a7 120, 124, 241 sqq., 214, 243, 275).<\/p>\n

59. Aussi n\u2019est-ce que cette hypoth\u00e8se (que j\u2019ose dire d\u00e9montr\u00e9e) qui rel\u00e8ve comme il faut la grandeur de Dieu : c\u2019est ce que Monsieur Bayle reconnut, lorsque dans son Dictionnaire (article Rorarius) il y fit des objections, o\u00f9 m\u00eame il fut tent\u00e9 de croire, que je donnais trop \u00e0 Dieu, et plus qu\u2019il n\u2019est possible. Mais il ne put all\u00e9guer aucune raison, pourquoi cette harmonie universelle,qui fait que toute substance exprime exactement toutes les autres par les rapports qu\u2019elle y a, f\u00fbt impossible.<\/p>\n

60. On voit d\u2019ailleurs dans ce que je viens de rapporter, les raisons a priori pourquoi les choses ne sauraient aller autrement. Parce que Dieu en r\u00e9glant le tout a eu \u00e9gard \u00e0 chaque partie, et particuli\u00e8rement \u00e0 chaque monade, dont la nature \u00e9tant repr\u00e9sentative, rien ne la saurait borner \u00e0 ne repr\u00e9senter qu\u2019une partie des choses ; quoiqu\u2019il soit vrai que cette repr\u00e9sentation n\u2019est que confuse dans le d\u00e9tail de tout l\u2019univers, et ne peut \u00eatre distincte que dans une petite partie des choses, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire dans celles qui sont ou les plus prochaines, ou les plus grandes par rapport \u00e0 chacune des Monades ; autrement chaque monade serait une Divinit\u00e9. Ce n\u2019est pas dans l\u2019objet, mais dans la modification de la connaissance de l\u2019objet, que les monades sont born\u00e9es. Elles vont toutes confus\u00e9ment \u00e0 l\u2019infini, au tout ; mais elles sont limit\u00e9es et distingu\u00e9es par les degr\u00e9s des perceptions distinctes.<\/strong><\/p>\n

61. Et les compos\u00e9s symbolisent en cela avec les simples. Car, comme tout est plein, ce qui rend toute la mati\u00e8re li\u00e9e, et comme dans le plein tout mouvement fait quelque effet sur les corps distants, \u00e0 mesure de la distance, de sorte que chaque corps est affect\u00e9 non seulement par ceux qui le touchent, et se ressent en quelque fa\u00e7on de tout ce qui leur arrive, mais aussi par leur moyen se ressent encore de ceux qui touchent les premiers, dont il est touch\u00e9 imm\u00e9diatement : il s\u2019ensuit, que cette communication va \u00e0 quelque distance que ce soit. Et par cons\u00e9quent tout corps se ressent de tout ce qui se fait dans l\u2019univers ; tellement que celui qui voit tout, pourrait lire dans chacun ce qui se fait partout et m\u00eame ce qui s\u2019est fait ou se fera ; en remarquant dans le pr\u00e9sentce qui est \u00e9loign\u00e9, tant selon les temps que selon les lieux : sumpnoia panta<\/em>, disait Hippocrate. Mais une Ame ne peut lire en elle-m\u00eame que ce qui y est repr\u00e9sent\u00e9 distinctement, elle ne saurait d\u00e9velopper tout d\u2019un coup tous ses replis, car ils vont \u00e0 l\u2019infini.<\/strong><\/p>\n

62. Ainsi quoique chaque monade cr\u00e9\u00e9e repr\u00e9sente tout l\u2019univers, elle repr\u00e9sente plus distinctement le corps qui lui est affect\u00e9 particuli\u00e8rement et dont elle fait l\u2019Ent\u00e9l\u00e9chie : et comme ce corps exprime tout l\u2019univers par la connexion de toute la mati\u00e8re dans le plein, l\u2019\u00e2me repr\u00e9sente aussi tout l\u2019universen repr\u00e9sentant ce corps, qui lui appartient d\u2019une mani\u00e8re particuli\u00e8re<\/strong> (\u00a7 400).<\/p>\n

63. Le corps appartenant \u00e0 une Monade, qui en est l\u2019Ent\u00e9l\u00e9chie ou l\u2019\u00c2me, constitue avec l\u2019ent\u00e9l\u00e9chie ce qu\u2019on peut appeler un vivant<\/em>, et avec l\u2019\u00e2me cequ\u2019on appelle un animal<\/em>.<\/strong> Or ce corps d\u2019un vivant ou d\u2019un animal est toujours organique ; car toute Monade \u00e9tant un miroir de l\u2019univers \u00e0 sa mode<\/strong>, et l\u2019univers \u00e9tant r\u00e9gl\u00e9 dans un ordre parfait, il faut qu\u2019il y ait aussi un ordre dans le repr\u00e9sentant, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire dans les perceptions de l\u2019\u00e2me, et par cons\u00e9quent dans le corps, suivant lequel l\u2019univers y est repr\u00e9sent\u00e9 (\u00a7 403).<\/p>\n

64. Ainsi chaque corps organique d\u2019un vivant est une esp\u00e8ce de machine divine, ou d\u2019un automate naturel, qui surpasse infiniment tous les automates artificiels. Parce qu\u2019une machine faite par l\u2019art de l\u2019homme, n\u2019est pas machine dans chacune de ses parties. Par exemple : la dent d\u2019une roue de laiton a des parties ou fragments qui ne nous sont plus quelque chose d\u2019artificiel et n\u2019ontplus rien, qui marque de la machine par rapport \u00e0 l\u2019usage, o\u00f9 la roue \u00e9taitdestin\u00e9e. Mais les machines de la nature, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire les corps vivants, sont encore machines dans leurs moindres parties, jusqu\u2019\u00e0 l\u2019infini. C\u2019est ce qui fait la diff\u00e9rence entre la Nature et l\u2019Art, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire entre l\u2019art Divin et le n\u00f4tre<\/strong> (\u00a7 134, 146, 194, 483).<\/p>\n

65. Et l\u2019auteur de la nature a pu pratiquer cet artifice divin et infiniment merveilleux, parce que chaque portion de la mati\u00e8re n\u2019est pas seulement divisible \u00e0 l\u2019infini comme les anciens ont reconnu, mais encore sous-divis\u00e9e actuellement sans fin, chaque partie en parties, dont chacune a quelque mouvement propre, autrement il serait impossible, que chaque portion de la mati\u00e8re p\u00fbt exprimer tout l\u2019univers<\/strong> (Pr\u00e9lim. [Disc. d. l. conform.], \u00a7 70. Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e<\/em>, \u00a7 195).<\/p>\n

66. Par o\u00f9 l\u2019on voit qu\u2019il y a un monde de cr\u00e9atures, de vivants, d\u2019animaux, d\u2019ent\u00e9l\u00e9chies, d\u2019\u00e2mes dans la moindre partie de la mati\u00e8re.<\/strong><\/p>\n

67. Chaque portion de la mati\u00e8re peut \u00eatre con\u00e7ue, comme un jardin plein de plantes, et comme un \u00e9tang plein de poissons. Mais chaque rameau de la plante, chaque membre de l\u2019animal, chaque goutte de ses humeurs est encore un tel jardin, ou un tel \u00e9tang.<\/p>\n

68. Et quoique la terre et l\u2019air intercept\u00e9s entre les plantes du jardin, ou l\u2019eau intercept\u00e9e entre les poissons de l\u2019\u00e9tang, ne soit point plante, ni poisson ; ils en contiennent pourtant encore, mais le plus souvent d\u2019une subtilit\u00e9 \u00e0 nous imperceptible.<\/p>\n

69. Ainsi il n\u2019y a rien d\u2019inculte, de st\u00e9rile, de mort dans l\u2019univers, point de chaos, point de confusion qu\u2019en apparence<\/strong> ; \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s comme il en para\u00eetrait dans un \u00e9tang \u00e0 une distance dans laquelle on verrait un mouvement confus et grouillement, pour ainsi dire, de poissons de l\u2019\u00e9tang, sans discerner les poissons m\u00eames (Pr\u00e9f. ***, 5, b ****, 6 9).<\/p>\n

70. On voit par l\u00e0, que chaque corps vivant a une ent\u00e9l\u00e9chie dominante qui est l\u2019\u00e2me dans l\u2019animal ; mais les membres de ce corps vivant sont pleins d\u2019autres vivants, plantes, animaux, dont chacun a encore son ent\u00e9l\u00e9chie, ou son \u00e2me dominante<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

71. Mais il ne faut point s\u2019imaginer avec quelques-uns, qui avaient mal pris ma pens\u00e9e, que chaque \u00e2me a une masse ou portion de la mati\u00e8re propre ou affect\u00e9e \u00e0 elle pour toujours, et qu\u2019elle poss\u00e8de par cons\u00e9quent d\u2019autres vivants inf\u00e9rieurs, destin\u00e9s toujours \u00e0 son service. Car tous les corps sont dans un flux perp\u00e9tuel comme des rivi\u00e8res ; et des parties y entrent et en sortent continuellement<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

72. Ainsi l\u2019\u00e2me ne change de corps que peu \u00e0 peu et par degr\u00e9s, de sorte qu\u2019elle n\u2019est jamais d\u00e9pouill\u00e9e tout d\u2019un coup de tous ses organes ; et il y a souvent m\u00e9tamorphose dans les animaux, mais jamais M\u00e9tempsychose ni transmigration des Ames : il n\u2019y a pas non plus des Ames<\/em> tout \u00e0 fait s\u00e9par\u00e9es<\/em>, ni de G\u00e9nies <\/em>sans corps. Dieu seul en est d\u00e9tach\u00e9 enti\u00e8rement<\/strong> (\u00a7 90, 124).<\/p>\n

73. C\u2019est ce qui fait aussi qu\u2019il n\u2019y a jamais ni g\u00e9n\u00e9ration enti\u00e8re, ni mort parfaite prise \u00e0 la rigueur, consistant dans la s\u00e9paration de l\u2019\u00e2me. Et ce que nous appelons G\u00e9n\u00e9rations<\/em> sont des d\u00e9veloppements et des accroissements ; comme ce que nous appelons Morts<\/em>, sont des enveloppements et des diminutions.<\/strong><\/p>\n

74. Les philosophes ont \u00e9t\u00e9 fort embarrass\u00e9s sur l\u2019origine des formes, Ent\u00e9l\u00e9chies, ou Ames ; mais aujourd\u2019hui, lorsqu\u2019on s\u2019est aper\u00e7u, par des recherches exactes faites sur les plantes, les insectes et les animaux, que les corps organiques de la nature ne sont jamais produits d\u2019un chaos ou d\u2019une putr\u00e9faction ; mais toujours par les semences, dans lesquelles il y avait sans doute quelque pr\u00e9formation ; on a jug\u00e9, que non seulement le corps organique y \u00e9tait d\u00e9j\u00e0 avant la conception, mais encore une \u00e2me dans ce corps, et en un mot l\u2019animal m\u00eame ; et que par le moyen de la conception cet animal a \u00e9t\u00e9 seulement dispos\u00e9 \u00e0 une grande transformation pour devenir un animal d\u2019une autre esp\u00e8ce. On voit m\u00eame quelque chose d\u2019approchant hors de la g\u00e9n\u00e9ration, comme lorsque les vers deviennent mouches, et que les chenilles deviennent papillons (\u00a7 86, 89, Pr\u00e9f. ***, 5, b et pages suivantes 10, \u00a7 90, 187-188, 403, 86,
\n397).<\/p>\n

75. Les animaux<\/em>, dont quelques-uns sont \u00e9lev\u00e9s au degr\u00e9 des plus grands animaux par le moyen de la conception, peuvent \u00eatre appel\u00e9s spermatiques<\/em> ; mais ceux d\u2019entre eux qui demeurent dans leur esp\u00e8ce, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire la plupart, naissent, se multiplient et sont d\u00e9truits comme les grands animaux, et il n\u2019y a qu\u2019un petit nombre d\u2019\u00c9lus, qui passe \u00e0 un plus grand th\u00e9\u00e2tre.<\/p>\n

76. Mais ce n\u2019\u00e9tait que la moiti\u00e9 de la v\u00e9rit\u00e9 : j\u2019ai donc jug\u00e9 que si l\u2019animal ne commence jamais naturellement, il ne finit pas naturellement non plus<\/strong> ; et que non seulement il n\u2019y aura point de g\u00e9n\u00e9ration, mais encore point de destruction enti\u00e8re, ni mort prise \u00e0 la rigueur. Et ces raisonnements faits a
\nposteriori et tir\u00e9s des exp\u00e9riences s\u2019accordent parfaitement avec mes principes d\u00e9duits a priori comme ci- dessus (\u00a7 90).<\/p>\n

77. Ainsi on peut dire que non seulement l\u2019\u00e2me (miroir d\u2019un univers indestructible) est indestructible, mais encore l\u2019animal m\u00eame<\/strong>, quoique sa Machine p\u00e9risse souvent en partie, et quitte ou prenne des d\u00e9pouilles organiques.<\/p>\n

78. Ces principes m\u2019ont donn\u00e9 moyen d\u2019expliquer naturellement l\u2019union ou bien la conformit\u00e9 de l\u2019\u00e2me et du corps organique. L\u2019\u00e2me suit ses propres lois et le corps aussi les siennes ; et ils se rencontrent en vertu de l\u2019harmonie pr\u00e9\u00e9tablie entre toutes les substances, puisqu\u2019elles sont toutes les repr\u00e9sentations
\nd\u2019un m\u00eame univers (Pr\u00e9f. ***, 6 11, \u00a7 340, 352, 353, 358).<\/p>\n

79. Les \u00e2mes agissent selon les lois des causes finales par app\u00e9titions, fins et moyens. Les corps agissent selon les lois des causes efficientes ou des mouvements. Et les deux r\u00e8gnes, celui des causes efficientes et celui des causes finales sont harmoniques entre eux.<\/p>\n

80. Descartes a reconnu, que les \u00e2mes ne peuvent point donner de la force aux corps, parce qu\u2019il y a toujours la m\u00eame quantit\u00e9 de force dans la mati\u00e8re. Cependant il a cru que l\u2019\u00e2me pouvait changer la direction des corps. Mais c\u2019est parce qu\u2019on n\u2019a point su de son temps la loi de la nature, qui porte encore la conservation de la m\u00eame direction totale dans la mati\u00e8re. S\u2019il l\u2019avait remarqu\u00e9e, il serait tomb\u00e9 dans mon Syst\u00e8me de l\u2019Harmonie pr\u00e9\u00e9tablie (Pr\u00e9f. **** 12, \u00a7 22, 59, 60, 61, 62, 66, 345-346 sqq., 354-355).<\/p>\n

81. Ce Syst\u00e8me fait que les corps agissent comme si (par impossible) il n\u2019y avait point d\u2019Ames ; et que les Ames agissent, comme s\u2019il n\u2019y avait point de corps ; et que tous deux agissent comme si l\u2019un influait sur l\u2019autre.<\/p>\n

82. Quant aux Esprits ou Ames raisonnables, quoique je trouve qu\u2019il y a dans le fond la m\u00eame chose dans tous les vivants et animaux, comme nous venons de dire (savoir que l\u2019animal et l\u2019\u00c2me ne commencent qu\u2019avec le monde, et ne finissent pas non plus que le monde), il y a pourtant cela de particulier dans les Animaux raisonnables, que leurs petits Animaux spermatiques, tant qu\u2019ils ne sont que cela, ont seulement des \u00e2mes ordinaires ou sensitives; mais d\u00e8s que ceux qui sont \u00e9lus, pour ainsi dire, parviennent par une actuelle conception \u00e0 la nature humaine, leurs \u00e2mes sensitives sont \u00e9lev\u00e9es au degr\u00e9 de la raison et \u00e0 la pr\u00e9rogative des Esprits (\u00a7 91, 397).<\/p>\n

83. Entre autres diff\u00e9rences qu\u2019il y a entre les Ames ordinaires et les Esprits, dont j\u2019en ai d\u00e9j\u00e0 marqu\u00e9 une partie, il y a encore celle-ci : que les \u00e2mes en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral sont des miroirs vivants ou images de l\u2019univers des cr\u00e9atures ; mais que les esprits sont encore des images de la Divinit\u00e9 m\u00eame, ou de l\u2019Auteur m\u00eame de la nature : capables de conna\u00eetre le syst\u00e8me de l\u2019univers et d\u2019en imiter quelque chose par des \u00e9chantillons architectoniques ; chaque esprit \u00e9tant comme une petite divinit\u00e9 dans son d\u00e9partement<\/strong> (\u00a7 147).<\/p>\n

84. C\u2019est ce qui fait que les Esprits sont capables d\u2019entrer dans une mani\u00e8re de Soci\u00e9t\u00e9 avec Dieu<\/strong>, et qu\u2019il est \u00e0 leur \u00e9gard, non seulement ce qu\u2019un inventeur est \u00e0 sa Machine (comme Dieu l\u2019est par rapport aux autres cr\u00e9atures) mais encore ce qu\u2019un Prince est \u00e0 ses sujets, et m\u00eame un p\u00e8re \u00e0 ses enfants.<\/p>\n

85. D\u2019o\u00f9 il est ais\u00e9 de conclure, que l\u2019assemblage de tous les Esprits doit composer la Cit\u00e9 de Dieu, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire le plus parfait \u00c9tat qui soit possible sous le plus parfait des Monarques (\u00a7 146. Abr\u00e9g\u00e9 object.).<\/p>\n

86. Cette Cit\u00e9 de Dieu, cette Monarchie v\u00e9ritablement universelle est un Monde Moral, dans le monde Naturel, et ce qu\u2019il y a de plus \u00e9lev\u00e9 et de plus divin dans les ouvrages de Dieu : et c\u2019est en lui que consiste v\u00e9ritablement la gloire de Dieu, puisqu\u2019il n\u2019y en aurait point, si sa grandeur et sa bont\u00e9 n\u2019\u00e9taient pas connues et admir\u00e9es par les esprits, c\u2019est aussi par rapport \u00e0 cette Cit\u00e9 divine qu\u2019il a proprement de la Bont\u00e9, au lieu que sa sagesse et sa puissance se montrent partout.<\/p>\n

87. Comme nous avons \u00e9tabli ci-dessus une Harmonie parfaite entre deux R\u00e8gnes naturels, l\u2019un des causes Efficientes, l\u2019autre des Finales, nous devons remarquer ici encore une autre harmonie entre le r\u00e8gne Physique de la Nature et le r\u00e8gne Moral de la Gr\u00e2ce, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire, entre Dieu consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme Architecte de la Machine de l\u2019univers, et Dieu consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme Monarque de la Cit\u00e9 divine des Esprits (\u00a7 62, 74, 118, 248, 112, 130, 247).<\/p>\n

88. Cette Harmonie fait que les choses conduisent \u00e0 la Gr\u00e2ce par les voies m\u00eames de la Nature, et que ce globe par exemple doit \u00eatre d\u00e9truit et r\u00e9par\u00e9 par les voies naturelles dans les moments que le demande le gouvernement des Esprits ; pour le ch\u00e2timent des uns, et la r\u00e9compense des autres (\u00a7 18 sqq.,
\n110, 244-245, 340).<\/p>\n

89. On peut dire encore, que Dieu comme Architecte contente en tout Dieu, comme l\u00e9gislateur <\/strong>; et qu\u2019ainsi les p\u00e9ch\u00e9s doivent porter leur peine avec eux par l\u2019ordre de la nature ; et en vertu m\u00eame de la structure m\u00e9canique des choses ; et que de m\u00eame les belles actions s\u2019attireront leurs r\u00e9compenses par des voies machinales par rapport aux corps ; quoique cela ne puisse et ne doive pas arriver toujours sur-le-champ.<\/p>\n

90. Enfin sous ce gouvernement parfait il n\u2019y aurait point de bonne Action sans r\u00e9compense, point de mauvaise sans ch\u00e2timent : et tout doit r\u00e9ussir au bien des bons ; c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire de ceux qui ne sont point des m\u00e9contents dans ce grand \u00c9tat, qui se fient \u00e0 la Providence, apr\u00e8s avoir fait leur devoir, et qui aiment et imitent, comme il faut, l\u2019Auteur de tout bien, se plaisant dans la consid\u00e9ration de ses perfections suivant la nature du pur amour v\u00e9ritable, qui fait prendre plaisir \u00e0 la f\u00e9licit\u00e9 de ce qu\u2019on aime. C\u2019est ce qui fait travailler les personnes sages et vertueuses \u00e0 tout ce qui para\u00eet conforme \u00e0 la volont\u00e9 divine pr\u00e9somptive, ou ant\u00e9c\u00e9dente ; et se contenter cependant de ce que Dieu fait arriver effectivement par sa volont\u00e9 secr\u00e8te, cons\u00e9quente et d\u00e9cisive ; en reconnaissant, que si nous pouvions entendre assez l\u2019ordre de l\u2019univers, nous trouverions qu\u2019il surpasse tous les souhaits des plus sages, et qu\u2019il est impossible de le rendre meilleur qu\u2019il est ; non seulement pour le tout en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, mais encore pour nous-m\u00eames en particulier, si nous sommes attach\u00e9s, comme il faut \u00e0 l\u2019Auteur du tout, non seulement comme \u00e0 l\u2019Architecte et \u00e0 la cause efficiente de notre \u00eatre, mais encore comme \u00e0 notre Ma\u00eetre et \u00e0 la cause finale qui doit faire tout le but de notre volont\u00e9, et peut seul faire notre bonheur.<\/p>\n

FIN<\/p>\n

\n

<\/a>The Monadology<\/strong><\/p>\n

<\/div>\n

by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz<\/strong><\/p>\n

<\/div>\n

translated by Robert Latta (1898)
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

<\/a>1. The Monad, of which we shall here speak, is nothing but a simple substance, which enters into compounds. By ‘simple’ is meant ‘without parts.’ (Theod. 10.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>2. And there must be simple substances, since there are compounds; for a compound is nothing but a collection or aggregatum of simple things.<\/p>\n

<\/a>3. Now where there are no parts, there can be neither extension nor form [figure] nor divisibility. These Monads are the real atoms of nature and, in a word, the elements of things.<\/p>\n

<\/a>4. No dissolution of these elements need be feared, and there is no conceivable way in which a simple substance can be destroyed by natural means. (Theod. 89.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>5. For the same reason there is no conceivable way in which a simple substance can come into being by natural means, since it cannot be formed by the combination of parts [composition].<\/p>\n

<\/a>6. Thus it may be said that a Monad can only come into being or come to an end all at once; that is to say, it can come into being only by creation and come to an end only by annihilation, while that which is compound comes into being or comes to an end by parts.<\/p>\n

<\/a>7. Further, there is no way of explaining how a Monad can be altered in quality or internally changed by any other created thing; since it is impossible to change the place of anything in it or to conceive in it any internal motion which could be produced, directed, increased or diminished therein, although all this is possible in the case of compounds, in which there are changes among the parts. The Monads have no windows, through which anything could come in or go out. Accidents cannot separate themselves from substances nor go about outside of them, as the ‘sensible species’ of the Scholastics used to do. Thus neither substance nor accident can come into a Monad from outside.<\/p>\n

<\/a>8. Yet the Monads must have some qualities, otherwise they would not even be existing things. And if simple substances did not differ in quality, there would be absolutely no means of perceiving any change in things. For what is in the compound can come only from the simple elements it contains, and the Monads, if they had no qualities, would be indistinguishable from one another, since they do not differ in quantity. Consequently, space being a plenum, each part of space would always receive, in any motion, exactly the equivalent of what it already had, and no one state of things would be discernible from another.<\/p>\n

<\/a>9. Indeed, each Monad must be different from every other. For in nature there are never two beings which are perfectly alike and in which it is not possible to find an internal difference, or at least a difference founded upon an intrinsic quality [denomination].<\/p>\n

<\/a>10. I assume also as admitted that every created being, and consequently the created Monad, is subject to change, and further that this change is continuous in each.<\/p>\n

<\/a>11. It follows from what has just been said, that the natural changes of the Monads come from an internal principle, since an external cause can have no influence upon their inner being. (Theod. 396, 400.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>12. But, besides the principle of the change, there must be a particular series of changes [un detail de ce qui change], which constitutes, so to speak, the specific nature and variety of the simple substances.<\/p>\n

<\/a>13. This particular series of changes should involve a multiplicity in the unit [unite] or in that which is simple. For, as every natural change takes place gradually, something changes and something remains unchanged; and consequently a simple substance must be affected and related in many ways, although it has no parts.<\/p>\n

<\/a>14. The passing condition, which involves and represents a multiplicity in the unit [unite] or in the simple substance, is nothing but what is called Perception, which is to be distinguished from Apperception or Consciousness, as will afterwards appear. In this matter the Cartesian view is extremely defective, for it treats as non-existent those perceptions of which we are not consciously aware. This has also led them to believe that minds [esprits] alone are Monads, and that there are no souls of animals nor other Entelechies. Thus, like the crowd, they have failed to distinguish between a prolonged unconsciousness and absolute death, which has made them fall again into the Scholastic prejudice of souls entirely separate [from bodies], and has even confirmed ill-balanced minds in the opinion that souls are mortal.<\/p>\n

<\/a>15. The activity of the internal principle which produces change or passage from one perception to another may be called Appetition. It is true that desire [l’appetit] cannot always fully attain to the whole perception at which it aims, but it always obtains some of it and attains to new perceptions.<\/p>\n

<\/a>16. We have in ourselves experience of a multiplicity in simple substance, when we find that the least thought of which we are conscious involves variety in its object. Thus all those who admit that the soul is a simple substance should admit this multiplicity in the Monad; and M. Bayle ought not to have found any difficulty in this, as he has done in his Dictionary, article ‘Rorarius.’<\/p>\n

<\/a>17. Moreover, it must be confessed that perception and that which depends upon it are inexplicable on mechanical grounds, that is to say, by means of figures and motions. And supposing there were a machine, so constructed as to think, feel, and have perception, it might be conceived as increased in size, while keeping the same proportions, so that one might go into it as into a mill. That being so, we should, on examining its interior, find only parts which work one upon another, and never anything by which to explain a perception. Thus it is in a simple substance, and not in a compound or in a machine, that perception must be sought for. Further, nothing but this (namely, perceptions and their changes) can be found in a simple substance. It is also in this alone that all the internal activities of simple substances can consist. (Theod. Pref. [E. 474; G. vi. 37].)<\/p>\n

<\/a>18. All simple substances or created Monads might be called Entelechies, for they have in them a certain perfection (echousi to enteles); they have a certain self-sufficiency (autarkeia) which makes them the sources of their internal activities and, so to speak, incorporeal automata. (Theod. 87.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>19. If we are to give the name of Soul to everything which has perceptions and desires [appetits] in the general sense which I have explained, then all simple substances or created Monads might be called souls; but as feeling [le sentiment] is something more than a bare perception, I think it right that the general name of Monads or Entelechies should suffice for simple substances which have perception only, and that the name of Souls should be given only to those in which perception is more distinct, and is accompanied by memory.<\/p>\n

<\/a>20. For we experience in ourselves a condition in which we remember nothing and have no distinguishable perception; as when we fall into a swoon or when we are overcome with a profound dreamless sleep. In this state the soul does not perceptibly differ from a bare Monad; but as this state is not lasting, and the soul comes out of it, the soul is something more than a bare Monad. (Theod. 64.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>21. And it does not follow that in this state the simple substance is without any perception. That, indeed, cannot be, for the reasons already given; for it cannot perish, and it cannot continue to exist without being affected in some way, and this affection is nothing but its perception. But when there is a great multitude of little perceptions, in which there is nothing distinct, one is stunned; as when one turns continuously round in the same way several times in succession, whence comes a giddiness which may make us swoon, and which keeps us from distinguishing anything. Death can for a time put animals into this condition.<\/p>\n

<\/a>22. And as every present state of a simple substance is naturally a consequence of its preceding state, in such a way that its present is big with its future; (Theod. 350.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>23. And as, on waking from stupor, we are conscious of our perceptions, we must have had perceptions immediately before we awoke, although we were not at all conscious of them; for one perception can in a natural way come only from another perception, as a motion can in a natural way come only from a motion. (Theod. 401-403.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>24. It thus appears that if we had in our perceptions nothing marked and, so to speak, striking and highly-flavoured, we should always be in a state of stupor. And this is the state in which the bare Monads are.<\/p>\n

<\/a>25. We see also that nature has given heightened perceptions to animals, from the care she has taken to provide them with organs, which collect numerous rays of light, or numerous undulations of the air, in order, by uniting them, to make them have greater effect. Something similar to this takes place in smell, in taste and in touch, and perhaps in a number of other senses, which are unknown to us. And I will explain presently how that which takes place in the soul represents what happens in the bodily organs.<\/p>\n

<\/a>26. Memory provides the soul with a kind of consecutiveness, which resembles [imite] reason, but which is to be distinguished from it. Thus we see that when animals have a perception of something which strikes them and of which they have formerly had a similar perception, they are led, by means of representation in their memory, to expect what was combined with the thing in this previous perception, and they come to have feelings similar to those they had on the former occasion. For instance, when a stick is shown to dogs, they remember the pain it has caused them, and howl and run away. (Theod. Discours de la Conformite, &c., ss. 65.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>27. And the strength of the mental image which impresses and moves them comes either from the magnitude or the number of the preceding perceptions. For often a strong impression produces all at once the same effect as a long-formed habit, or as many and oft-repeated ordinary perceptions.<\/p>\n

<\/a>28. In so far as the concatenation of their perceptions is due to the principle of memory alone, men act like the lower animals, resembling the empirical physicians, whose methods are those of mere practice without theory. Indeed, in three-fourths of our actions we are nothing but empirics. For instance, when we expect that there will be daylight to-morrow, we do so empirically, because it has always so happened until now. It is only the astronomer who thinks it on rational grounds.<\/p>\n

<\/a>29. But it is the knowledge of necessary and eternal truths that distinguishes us from the mere animals and gives us Reason and the sciences, raising us to the knowledge of ourselves and of God. And it is this in us that is called the rational soul or mind [esprit].<\/p>\n

<\/a>30. It is also through the knowledge of necessary truths, and through their abstract expression, that we rise to acts of reflexion, which make us think of what is called I, and observe that this or that is within us: and thus, thinking of ourselves, we think of being, of substance, of the simple and the compound, of the immaterial, and of God Himself, conceiving that what is limited in us is in Him without limits. And these acts of reflexion furnish the chief objects of our reasonings. (Theod. Pref. [E. 469; G. vi. 27].)<\/p>\n

<\/a>31. Our reasonings are grounded upon two great principles, that of contradiction, in virtue of which we judge false that which involves a contradiction, and true that which is opposed or contradictory to the false; (Theod. 44, 169.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>32. And that of sufficient reason, in virtue of which we hold that there can be no fact real or existing, no statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason, why it should be so and not otherwise, although these reasons usually cannot be known by us. (Theod. 44, <\/a>196.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>33. There are also two kinds of truths, those of reasoning and those of fact. Truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposite is impossible: truths of fact are contingent and their opposite is possible. When a truth is necessary, its reason can be found by analysis, resolving it into more simple ideas and truths, until we come to those which are primary. (Theod. 170, 174, 189, 280-282, <\/a>367. Abrege, Object. 3.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>34. It is thus that in Mathematics speculative Theorems and practical Canons are reduced by analysis to Definitions, Axioms and Postulates.<\/p>\n

<\/a>35. In short, there are simple ideas, of which no definition can be given; there are also axioms and postulates, in a word, primary principles, which cannot be proved, and indeed have no need of proof; and these are identical propositions, whose opposite involves an express contradiction. (Theod. 36, 37, 44, 45, 49, 52, 121-122, 337, 340-344.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>36. But there must also be a sufficient reason for contingent truths or truths of fact, that is to say, for the sequence or connexion of the things which are dispersed throughout the universe of created beings, in which the analyzing into particular reasons might go on into endless detail, because of the immense variety of things in nature and the infinite division of bodies. There is an infinity of present and past forms and motions which go to make up the efficient cause of my present writing; and there is an infinity of minute tendencies and dispositions of my soul, which go to make its final cause.<\/p>\n

<\/a>37. And as all this detail again involves other prior or more detailed contingent things, each of which still needs a similar analysis to yield its reason, we are no further forward: and the sufficient or final reason must be outside of the sequence or series of particular contingent things, however infinite this series may be.<\/p>\n

<\/a>38. Thus the final reason of things must be in a necessary substance, in which the variety of particular changes exists only eminently, as in its source; and this substance we call God. (Theod. <\/a>7.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>39. Now as this substance is a sufficient reason of all this variety of particulars, which are also connected together throughout; there is only one God, and this God is sufficient.<\/p>\n

<\/a>40. We may also hold that this supreme substance, which is unique, universal and necessary, nothing outside of it being independent of it,- this substance, which is a pure sequence of possible being, must be illimitable and must contain as much reality as is possible.<\/p>\n

<\/a>41. Whence it follows that God is absolutely perfect; for perfection is nothing but amount of positive reality, in the strict sense, leaving out of account the limits or bounds in things which are limited. And where there are no bounds, that is to say in God, perfection is absolutely infinite. (Theod. 22, Pref. [E. 469 a; G. vi. 27].)<\/p>\n

<\/a>42. It follows also that created beings derive their perfections from the influence of God, but that their imperfections come from their own nature, which is incapable of being without limits. For it is in this that they differ from God. An instance of this original imperfection of created beings may be seen in the natural inertia of bodies. (Theod. 20, 27-30, 153, 167, 377 sqq.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>43. It is farther true that in God there is not only the source of existences but also that of essences, in so far as they are real, that is to say, the source of what is real in the possible. For the understanding of God is the region of eternal truths or of the ideas on which they depend, and without Him there would be nothing real in the possibilities of things, and not only would there be nothing in existence, but nothing would even be possible. (Theod. 20.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>44. For if there is a reality in essences or possibilities, or rather in eternal truths, this reality must needs be founded in something existing and actual, and consequently in the existence of the necessary Being, in whom essence involves existence, or in whom to be possible is to be actual. (Theod. 184-189, 335.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>45. Thus God alone (or the necessary Being) has this prerogative that He must necessarily exist, if He is possible. And as nothing can interfere with the possibility of that which involves no limits, no negation and consequently no contradiction, this [His possibility] is sufficient of itself to make known the existence of God a priori. We have thus proved it, through the reality of eternal truths. But a little while ago we proved it also a posteriori, since there exist contingent beings, which can have their final or sufficient reason only in the necessary Being, which has the reason of its existence in itself.<\/p>\n

<\/a>46. We must not, however, imagine, as some do, that eternal truths, being dependent on God, are arbitrary and depend on His will, as Descartes, and afterwards M. Poiret, appear to have held. That is true only of contingent truths, of which the principle is fitness [convenance] or choice of the best, whereas necessary truths depend solely on His understanding and are its inner object. (Theod. 180-184, 185, 335, 351, 380.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>47. Thus God alone is the primary unity or original simple substance, of which all created or derivative Monads are products and have their birth, so to speak, through continual fulgurations of the Divinity from moment to moment, limited by the receptivity of the created being, of whose essence it is to have limits. (Theod. 382-391, 398, 395.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>48. In God there is Power, which is the source of all, also Knowledge, whose content is the variety of the ideas, and finally Will, which makes changes or products according to the principle of the best. (Theod. 7, 149, 150.) These characteristics correspond to what in the created Monads forms the ground or basis, to the faculty of Perception and to the faculty of Appetition. But in God these attributes are absolutely infinite or perfect; and in the created Monads or the Entelechies (or perfectihabiae, as Hermolaus Barbarus translated the word) there are only imitations of these attributes, according to the degree of perfection of the Monad. (Theod. 87.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>49. A created thing is said to act outwardly in so far as it has perfection, and to suffer [or be passive, patir] in relation to another, in so far as it is imperfect. Thus activity [action] is attributed to a Monad, in so far as it has distinct perceptions, and passivity [passion] in so far as its perceptions are confused. (Theod. 32, 66, 386.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>50. And one created thing is more perfect than another, in this, that there is found in the more perfect that which serves to explain a priori what takes place in the less perfect, and it is on this account that the former is said to act upon the latter.<\/p>\n

<\/a>51. But in simple substances the influence of one Monad upon another is only ideal, and it can have its effect only through the mediation of God, in so far as in the ideas of God any Monad rightly claims that God, in regulating the others from the beginning of things, should have regard to it. For since one created Monad cannot have any physical influence upon the inner being of another, it is only by this means that the one can be dependent upon the other. (Theod. 9, 54, 65, 66, 201. Abrege, Object. 3.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>52. Accordingly, among created things, activities and passivities are mutual. For God, comparing two simple substances, finds in each reasons which oblige Him to adapt the other to it, and consequently what is active in certain respects is passive from another point of view; active in so far as what we distinctly know in it serves to explain [rendre raison de] what takes place in another, and passive in so far as the explanation [raison] of what takes place in it is to be found in that which is distinctly known in another. (Theod. 66.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>53. Now, as in the Ideas of God there is an infinite number of possible universes, and as only one of them can be actual, there must be a sufficient reason for the choice of God, which leads Him to decide upon one rather than another. (Theod. 8, 10, 44, 173, 196 sqq., 225, 414-416.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>54. And this reason can be found only in the fitness [convenance], or in the degrees of perfection, that these worlds possess, since each possible thing has the right to aspire to existence in proportion to the amount of perfection it contains in germ. (Theod. 74, 167, 350, 201, 130, 352, 345 sqq., 354.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>55. Thus the actual existence of the best that wisdom makes known to God is due to this, that His goodness makes Him choose it, and His power makes Him produce it. (Theod. 8, 78, 80, 84, 119, 204, 206, 208. Abrege, Object. 1 and 8.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>56. Now this connexion or adaptation of all created things to each and of each to all, means that each simple substance has relations which express all the others, and, consequently, that it is a perpetual living mirror of the universe. (Theod. 130, 360.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>57. And as the same town, looked at from various sides, appears quite different and becomes as it were numerous in aspects [perspectivement]; even so, as a result of the infinite number of simple substances, it is as if there were so many different universes, which, nevertheless are nothing but aspects [perspectives] of a single universe, according to the special point of view of each Monad. (Theod. 147.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>58. And by this means there is obtained as great variety as possible, along with the greatest possible order; that is to say, it is the way to get as much perfection as possible. (Theod. 120, 124, 241 sqq., 214, 243, 275.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>59. Besides, no hypothesis but this (which I venture to call proved) fittingly exalts the greatness of God; and this Monsieur Bayle recognized when, in his Dictionary (article Rorarius), he raised objections to it, in which indeed he was inclined to think that I was attributing too much to God- more than it is possible to attribute. But he was unable to give any reason which could show the impossibility of this universal harmony, according to which every substance exactly expresses all others through the relations it has with them.<\/p>\n

<\/a>60. Further, in what I have just said there may be seen the reasons a priori why things could not be otherwise than they are. For God in regulating the whole has had regard to each part, and in particular to each Monad, whose nature being to represent, nothing can confine it to the representing of only one part of things; though it is true that this representation is merely confused as regards the variety of particular things [le detail] in the whole universe, and can be distinct only as regards a small part of things, namely, those which are either nearest or greatest in relation to each of the Monads; otherwise each Monad would be a deity. It is not as regards their object, but as regards the different ways in which they have knowledge of their object, that the Monads are limited. In a confused way they all strive after [vont a] the infinite, the whole; but they are limited and differentiated through the degrees of their distinct perceptions.<\/p>\n

<\/a>61. And compounds are in this respect analogous with [symbolisent avec] simple substances. For all is a plenum (and thus all matter is connected together) and in the plenum every motion has an effect upon distant bodies in proportion to their distance, so that each body not only is affected by those which are in contact with it and in some way feels the effect of everything that happens to them, but also is mediately affected by bodies adjoining those with which it itself is in immediate contact. Wherefore it follows that this inter-communication of things extends to any distance, however great. And consequently every body feels the effect of all that takes place in the universe, so that he who sees all might read in each what is happening everywhere, and even what has happened or shall happen, observing in the present that which is far off as well in time as in place: sympnoia panta, as Hippocrates said. But a soul can read in itself only that which is there represented distinctly; it cannot all at once unroll everything that is enfolded in it, for its complexity is infinite.<\/p>\n

<\/a>62. Thus, although each created Monad represents the whole universe, it represents more distinctly the body which specially pertains to it, and of which it is the entelechy; and as this body expresses the whole universe through the connexion of all matter in the plenum, the soul also represents the whole universe in representing this body, which belongs to it in a special way. (Theod. 400.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>63. The body belonging to a Monad (which is its entelechy or its soul) constitutes along with the entelechy what may be called a living being, and along with the soul what is called an animal. Now this body of living being or of an animal is always organic; for, as every Monad is, in its own way, a mirror of the universe, and as the universe is ruled according to a perfect order, there must also be order in that which represents it, i.e. in the perceptions of the soul, and consequently there must be order in the body, through which the universe is represented in the soul. (Theod. 403.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>64. Thus the organic body of each living being is a kind of divine machine or natural automaton, which infinitely surpasses all artificial automata. For a machine made by the skill of man is not a machine in each of its parts. For instance, the tooth of a brass wheel has parts or fragments which for us are not artificial products, and which do not have the special characteristics of the machine, for they give no indication of the use for which the wheel was intended. But the machines of nature, namely, living bodies, are still machines in their smallest parts ad infinitum. It is this that constitutes the difference between nature and art, that is to say, between the divine art and ours. (Theod. 134, 146, 194, 403.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>65. And the Author of nature has been able to employ this divine and infinitely wonderful power of art, because each portion of matter is not only infinitely divisible, as the ancients observed, but is also actually subdivided without end, each part into further parts, of which each has some motion of its own; otherwise it would be impossible for each portion of matter to express the whole universe. (Theod. Prelim., Disc. de la Conform. 70, and 195.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>66. Whence it appears that in the smallest particle of matter there is a world of creatures, living beings, animals, entelechies, souls.<\/p>\n

<\/a>67. Each portion of matter may be conceived as like a garden full of plants and like a pond full of fishes. But each branch of every plant, each member of every animal, each drop of its liquid parts is also some such garden or pond.<\/p>\n

<\/a>68. And though the earth and the air which are between the plants of the garden, or the water which is between the fish of the pond, be neither plant nor fish; yet they also contain plants and fishes, but mostly so minute as to be imperceptible to us.<\/p>\n

<\/a>69. Thus there is nothing fallow, nothing sterile, nothing dead in the universe, no chaos, no confusion save in appearance, somewhat as it might appear to be in a pond at a distance, in which one would see a confused movement and, as it were, a swarming of fish in the pond, without separately distinguishing the fish themselves. (Theod. Pref. [E. 475 b; 477 b; G. vi. 40, 44].)<\/p>\n

<\/a>70. Hence it appears that each living body has a dominant entelechy, which in an animal is the soul; but the members of this living body are full of other living beings, plants, animals, each of which has also its dominant entelechy or soul.<\/p>\n

<\/a>71. But it must not be imagined, as has been done by some who have misunderstood my thought, that each soul has a quantity or portion of matter belonging exclusively to itself or attached to it for ever, and that it consequently owns other inferior living beings, which are devoted for ever to its service. For all bodies are in a perpetual flux like rivers, and parts are entering into them and passing out of them continually.<\/p>\n

<\/a>72. Thus the soul changes its body only by degrees, little by little, so that it is never all at once deprived of all its organs; and there is often metamorphosis in animals, but never metempsychosis or transmigration of souls; nor are there souls entirely separate [from bodies] nor unembodied spirits [genies sans corps]. God alone is completely without body. (Theod. 90, 124.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>73. It also follows from this that there never is absolute birth [generation] nor complete death, in the strict sense, consisting in the separation of the soul from the body. What we call births [generations] are developments and growths, while what we call deaths are envelopments and diminutions.<\/p>\n

<\/a>74. Philosophers have been much perplexed about the origin of forms, entelechies, or souls; but nowadays it has become known, through careful studies of plants, insects, and animals, that the organic bodies of nature are never products of chaos or putrefaction, but always come from seeds, in which there was undoubtedly some preformation; and it is held that not only the organic body was already there before conception, but also a soul in this body, and, in short, the animal itself; and that by means of conception this animal has merely been prepared for the great transformation involved in its becoming an animal of another kind. Something like this is indeed seen apart from birth [generation], as when worms become flies and caterpillars become butterflies. (Theod. 86, 89. Pref. [E. 475 b; G. vi. 40 sqq.]; 90, 187, 188, 403, 86, 397.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>75. The animals, of which some are raised by means of conception to the rank of larger animals, may be called spermatic, but those among them which are not so raised but remain in their own kind (that is, the majority) are born, multiply, and are destroyed like the large animals, and it is only a few chosen ones [elus] that pass to a greater theatre.<\/p>\n

<\/a>76. But this is only half of the truth, and accordingly I hold that if an animal never comes into being by natural means [naturellement], no more does it come to an end by natural means; and that not only will there be no birth [generation], but also no complete destruction or death in the strict sense. And these reasonings, made a posteriori and drawn from experience are in perfect agreement with my principles deduced a priori, as above. (Theod. 90.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>77. Thus it may be said that not only the soul (mirror of an indestructible universe) is indestructible, but also the animal itself, though its mechanism [machine] may often perish in part and take off or put on an organic slough [des depouilles organiques].<\/p>\n

<\/a>78. These principles have given me a way of explaining naturally the union or rather the mutual agreement [conformite] of the soul and the organic body. The soul follows its own laws, and the body likewise follows its own laws; and they agree with each other in virtue of the pre-established harmony between all substances, since they are all representations of one and the same universe. (Pref. [E. 475 a; G. vi. 39]; Theod. 340, 352, 353, 358.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>79. Souls act according to the laws of final causes through appetitions, ends, and means. Bodies act according to the laws of efficient causes or motions. And the two realms, that of efficient causes and that of final causes, are in harmony with one another.<\/p>\n

<\/a>80. Descartes recognized that souls cannot impart any force to bodies, because there is always the same quantity of force in matter. Nevertheless he was of opinion that the soul could change the direction of bodies. But that is because in his time it was not known that there is a law of nature which affirms also the conservation of the same total direction in matter. Had Descartes noticed this he would have come upon my system of pre-established harmony. (Pref. [E. 477 a; G. vi. 44]; Theod. 22, 59, 60, 61, 63, 66, 345, 346 sqq., 354, 355.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>81. According to this system bodies act as if (to suppose the impossible) there were no souls, and souls act as if there were no bodies, and both act as if each influenced the other.<\/p>\n

<\/a>82. As regards minds [esprits] or rational souls, though I find that what I have just been saying is true of all living beings and animals (namely that animals and souls come into being when the world begins and no more come to an end that the world does), yet there is this peculiarity in rational animals, that their spermatic animalcules, so long as they are only spermatic, have merely ordinary or sensuous [sensitive] souls; but when those which are chosen [elus], so to speak, attain to human nature through an actual conception, their sensuous souls are raised to the rank of reason and to the prerogative of minds [esprits]. (Theod. 91, 397.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>83. Among other differences which exist between ordinary souls and minds [esprits], some of which differences I have already noted, there is also this: that souls in general are living mirrors or images of the universe of created things, but that minds are also images of the Deity or Author of nature Himself, capable of knowing the system of the universe, and to some extent of imitating it through architectonic ensamples [echantillons], each mind being like a small divinity in its own sphere. (Theod. 147.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>84. It is this that enables spirits [or minds- esprits] to enter into a kind of fellowship with God, and brings it about that in relation to them He is not only what an inventor is to his machine (which is the relation of God to other created things), but also what a prince is to his subjects, and, indeed, what a father is to his children.<\/p>\n

<\/a>85. Whence it is easy to conclude that the totality [assemblage] of all spirits [esprits] must compose the City of God, that is to say, the most perfect State that is possible, under the most perfect of Monarchs. (Theod. 146; Abrege, Object. 2.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>86. This City of God, this truly universal monarchy, is a moral world in the natural world, and is the most exalted and most divine among the works of God; and it is in it that the glory of God really consists, for He would have no glory were not His greatness and His goodness known and admired by spirits [esprits]. It is also in relation to this divine City that God specially has goodness, while His wisdom and His power are manifested everywhere. (Theod. 146; Abrege, Object. 2.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>87. As we have shown above that there is a perfect harmony between the two realms in nature, one of efficient, and the other of final causes, we should here notice also another harmony between the physical realm of nature and the moral realm of grace, that is to say, between God, considered as Architect of the mechanism [machine] of the universe and God considered as Monarch of the divine City of spirits [esprits]. (Theod. 62, 74, 118, 248, 112, 130, 247.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>88. A result of this harmony is that things lead to grace by the very ways of nature, and that this globe, for instance, must be destroyed and renewed by natural means at the very time when the government of spirits requires it, for the punishment of some and the reward of others. (Theod. 18 sqq., 110, 244, 245, 340.)<\/p>\n

<\/a>89. It may also be said that God as Architect satisfies in all respects God as Lawgiver, and thus that sins must bear their penalty with them, through the order of nature, and even in virtue of the mechanical structure of things; and similarly that noble actions will attain their rewards by ways which, on the bodily side, are mechanical, although this cannot and ought not always to happen immediately.<\/p>\n

<\/a>90. Finally, under this perfect government no good action would be unrewarded and no bad one unpunished, and all should issue in the well-being of the good, that is to say, of those who are not malcontents in this great state, but who trust in Providence, after having done their duty, and who love and imitate, as is meet, the Author of all good, finding pleasure in the contemplation of His perfections, as is the way of genuine ‘pure love,’ which takes pleasure in the happiness of the beloved. This it is which leads wise and virtuous people to devote their energies to everything which appears in harmony with the presumptive or antecedent will of God, and yet makes them content with what God actually brings to pass by His secret, consequent and positive [decisive] will, recognizing that if we could sufficiently understand the order of the universe, we should find that it exceeds all the desires of the wisest men, and that it is impossible to make it better than it is, not only as a whole and in general but also for ourselves in particular, if we are attached, as we ought to be, to the Author of all, not only as to the architect and efficient cause of our being, but as to our master and to the final cause, which ought to be the whole aim of our will, and which can alone make our happiness. (Theod. 134, 278. Pref. [E. 469; G. vi. 27, 28].)<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

THE END<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Monadologie. Epist\u00eam\u00e8 du pli Leibniz, La Monadologie, Principes de philosophie, 1714. PRINCIPIA PHILOSOPHI\u00c6 SEU THESES IN GRATIAM PRINCIPIS EUGENII CONSCRIPT\u00c6 Voici en un court et \u00e9blouissant trait\u00e9 le r\u00e9sum\u00e9 de la pens\u00e9e de Leibniz. La Monadologie est la quintessence philosophique de sesEssais de Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e. Or il se trouve que ces \u2026 Lire plus \/ Read more<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":1290,"parent":43,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-49","page","type-page","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.archipress.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/49","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.archipress.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.archipress.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.archipress.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.archipress.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=49"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/www.archipress.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/49\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1292,"href":"https:\/\/www.archipress.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/49\/revisions\/1292"}],"up":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.archipress.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/43"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.archipress.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/1290"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.archipress.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=49"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}